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Abstract  This  paper  analyzes  the  influence  of  financial  distress  on  the  investment  behavior  of
companies.  The  analysis  includes  companies  from  Germany,  Canada,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  UK
and USA,  which  cover  a  wide  spectrum  of  different  institutional  environments.  The  method-
ology used  is  panel  data  estimation  using  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (System-GMM),
thereby  allowing  control  of  both  unobservable  heterogeneity  and  the  problems  of  endogeneity
in explanatory  variables.  The  results  show  that  the  influence  of  financial  distress  on  investment
is different  according  to  the  investment  opportunities  available  to  companies.  So,  companies  in
difficulties  with  fewer  opportunities  have  the  greatest  propensity  to  under-invest,  while  firms  in
difficulties  with  better  opportunities  do  not  present  different  investment  behavior  than  healthyTobin’s  q companies.
© 2013  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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financial  constraint  is  not  observable,  so  different  papers
use  different  proxies  that  are  not  related  with  the  financial
situation  of  the  firm.1ntroduction
inancial  literature  widely  discusses  the  investment  deci-
ions  of  companies.  The  study  of  the  relationship  between
ash  flow  and  investment  level  is  the  most  common  way
f  analyzing  the  problems  of  over-  and  under-investment
Kaplan  and  Zingales,  1997;  Cleary,  1999;  Fazzari  et  al.,
988;  Hoshi  et  al.,  1991).  However,  the  study  of  over-  and
nder-investment  decisions  in  companies  in  financial  dis-
ress  is  a  topic  that  still  requires  more  in-depth  study.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 942203906; fax: +34 942201890.
E-mail addresses: carlos.lopez@unican.es (C. López-Gutiérrez),
anfilis@unican.es (S. Sanfilippo-Azofra), torreb@unican.es
B. Torre-Olmo). u
t
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2014.09.001
340-9436/© 2013 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. Th
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Previous  literature  on  investment  decisions  identifies
he  existence  of  financial  constraints  as  a  key  variable.
hagat  et  al.  (2005)  found  that  ‘‘financially  distressed  firms
ehave  differently  from  financially  constrained  firms’’,  so
he  results  considering  financial  constraints  are  not  directly
pplicable  to  companies  in  financial  distress,  even  consider-
ng  that  companies  in  financial  distress  are  subject  to  such
onstraints.  We  must  take  into  account  that  the  degree  of1 To identify financially-constrained firms, some of these papers
se dividend payout ratios (Fazzari et al., 1988), and size, based on
he notion that smaller firms will be more financially constrained
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ation  will  condition  their  investment  behavior.  One  of  theInvestment  decisions  of  companies  in  financial  distress  
The  influence  of  financial  distress  on  the  investment
behavior  of  firms  has  been  analyzed  indirectly  in  some
papers.  Whited  (1992)  studied  the  behavior  investment
when  firms  are  subject  to  borrowing  constraints,  find-
ing  that  difficulties  in  obtaining  debt  finance  have  an
impact  on  investment.  Bhagat  et  al.  (2005)  analyzed  the
investment--cash  flow  sensitivity  of  firms  in  financial  dis-
tress,  finding  that  the  relationship  between  investment  and
internal  funds  for  these  firms  is  conditioned  by  operating
profits.  White  (1996)  proposes,  from  a  theoretical  point
of  view,  that  the  problems  of  over-  and  under-investment
can  be  exacerbated  in  companies  in  financial  distress  even
before  they  file  for  bankruptcy.  However,  previous  works
have  not  empirically  tested  this  approach  until  now,  since
they  do  not  study  the  effect  that  financial  distress  has  on  a
firm’s  investment  policy.
The  main  contribution  of  this  work  is  to  conduct  an
empirical  analysis  on  over  and  under-investment  problems,
explicitly  considering  the  implications  that  the  existence  of
financial  distress  has  on  the  investment  behavior  of  com-
panies.  The  paper  proposes  several  hypotheses  that  relate
the  existence  of  financial  distress  to  problems  of  over-  and
under-investment.  The  proposal  is  that  the  very  existence
of  difficulties  is  a  crucial  factor  in  explaining  the  investment
behavior  of  firms.  However,  not  all  firms  in  distress  will  show
similar  behavior.  Those  who  have  fewer  opportunities  for
investment  will  have  a  greater  tendency  to  under  invest,
while,  in  the  opposite  case,  problems  of  over-investment
could  arise.
The  testing  of  these  hypotheses  is  complex,  since  it  is
necessary  to  have  a  variable  to  measure  the  degree  of
over-  and  under-investment  by  companies.  To  address  this
problem,  unlike  the  previous  empirical  work,  this  article
proposes  a  measure  of  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  that
allows  determining  whether  firms  in  distress  have  a  higher
propensity  to  over-  or  under-invest.  This  measure  is  the  level
of  investment  relative  to  investment  opportunities  avail-
able  to  the  firm  (measured  by  Tobin’s  q).  In  addition,  the
empirical  analysis  takes  into  account  all  firms,  healthy  and
financially  distressed,  allowing  the  analysis  of  whether  the
investment  behavior  differs  for  the  two  groups  of  compa-
nies.
The  analysis  includes  companies  from  Germany,  Canada,
Spain,  France,  Italy,  UK  and  USA,  which  cover  a  wide
spectrum  of  different  institutional  environments.  The
methodology  used  is  panel  data  estimation  using  the  Gener-
alized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM).  This  methodology  allows
controlling  both  unobservable  heterogeneity  and  the  prob-
lems  of  endogeneity  in  explanatory  variables  through  the
use  of  instruments.
The  results  show  that  the  influence  of  financial  distress
on  investment  is  different  in  accordance  with  the  invest-
ment  opportunities  available  to  the  company.  Therefore,
the  companies  with  fewer  opportunities  have  the  greatest
propensity  to  under-invest,  while  firms  in  difficulties  with
because they face higher informational asymmetry problems and
agency costs (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Another approach used is
multivariable analysis, which considers an entire profile of char-
acteristics shared by a particular firm and its dividend payment
behavior (Cleary, 1999; Maestro et al., 2007).
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reater  opportunities  do  not  present  different  investment
ehavior  than  healthy  companies.
heory and testable hypotheses
he  introduction  of  imperfections  in  capital  markets  in  the
odel  of  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  means  that  compa-
ies  will  not  always  be  able  to  make  all  the  investments
hat  create  value.  In  these  situations,  the  company  may
ncounter  problems  from  sub-optimal  investment  decisions
ue  to  the  existence  of  imperfections  in  capital  markets,
uch  as  information  asymmetry  and  agency  costs.  In  other
ords,  it  may  occur  that  the  firms  do  not  undertake  all  prof-
table  projects,  under-investment,  or  that  the  firm  carry  out
xcessively  risky  projects  with  a negative  net  present  value,
ver-investment  (Morgado  and  Pindado  (2003)  present  a
omprehensive  review  of  these  problems).
Financial  literature  contains  numerous  studies  that
xamine  investment  decisions  and  all  the  problems  associ-
ted  with  such  decisions  in  companies.  Most  of  these  studies
ocus  on  analyzing  the  sensitivity  of  the  investment  deci-
ion  to  the  availability  of  cash  flow.  However,  several  factors
ffect  this  relationship  between  investment  and  cash  flow.
ccording  to  Hoshi  et  al.  (1991),  a  problem  in  analyzing  this
elationship  is  that  the  generation  of  greater  cash  flow  may
e  a  sign  of  good  management  in  the  past  and  such  compa-
ies  are  more  likely  to  remain  well  managed  in  the  future.
n  this  case,  these  companies  have  more  liquidity  and  would
ave  greater  investment  opportunities,  which  would  lead
o  a higher  level  of  investment  due  to  the  higher  level  of
anagement  and  not  only  the  availability  of  higher  cash
ow.
Existing  literature  focuses  on  studying  these  different
nterpretations  of  the  relationship  between  investment  and
ash  flow.  In  order  to  go  deeper  into  the  analysis  of
he  relationship  between  internal  funds  and  investment,
esearchers  have  taken  into  account  the  existence  of  growth
pportunities  and  financial  constraints.  The  results  show  a
ositive  relationship  between  growth  opportunities  and  the
evel  of  investment,  but  with  regard  to  financial  constraints,
he  results  are  less  clear.  On  the  one  hand,  some  authors
nd  that  companies  with  higher  financial  constraints  have  a
reater  sensitivity  to  cash  flow  (Lopez  Iturriaga,  2006;  Hoshi
t  al.,  1991;  Fazzari  et  al.,  2000).  On  the  other  hand,  other
tudies  find  the  opposite  relationship,  that  is,  greater  sen-
itivity  to  cash  flow  for  companies  with  fewer  restrictions
Kaplan  and  Zingales,  1997,  2000;  Cleary,  1999;  Kadapakkam
t  al.,  1998).2
However,  all  these  studies  exclude  companies  in  financial
istress  from  the  analysis  because  their  own  financial  situ-efining  characteristics  of  firms  in  distress  is  the  existence  of
nancial  constraints  and  strained  access  to  credit,  stemming
2 The apparent contradiction between these results may  be due
o the different ways of measuring financial constraints, since they
re not directly observable. Replicating these articles with different
easures of financial constraints used by previous authors, Moyen
2004) finds that the contradiction in the results can be explained
y the way companies are classified in terms of their degree of
onstraint.
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By  including  only  listed  companies,  the  number  of  firms
traded  on  each  of  the  securities  exchanges  conditions  the
size  by  country.  However,  the  table  shows  that  the  sample76  
rom  their  situation.  However,  Bhagat  et  al.  (2005)  find  that
rms  in  financial  distress  do  not  behave  the  same  way  as
ompanies  with  financial  constraints.  In  a  descriptive  analy-
is  of  their  sample,  they  find  that  financially  distressed  firms
ave  some  characteristics  in  common  with  most  financially
onstrained  firms,  such  as  a  greater  Tobin’s  q,  a  smaller  size
r  a  higher  market-to-book  ratio.  However,  they  find  that,
n  contrast  to  most  financially  constrained  firms,  companies
n  financial  distress  invest  less,  have  lower  free  cash  flows,
igher  leverage  and  lower  growth  rate  of  sales.  Due  to  these
ifferences,  Bhagat  et  al.  (2005)  conclude  that  the  invest-
ent  behavior  of  firms  in  distress  in  response  to  variations
n  cash  flow  differs  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  companies
ith  financial  constraints.
In  the  same  way,  Pindado  et  al.  (2008)  also  find  evidence
f  differential  investment  behavior  presented  by  firms  in
istress.  Their  results  show  that  the  characteristics  of  insol-
ency  laws  exert  a  distorting  effect  on  investment  decisions
f  firms  given  that  they  play  a  fundamental  role  in  explain-
ng  the  sensitivity  of  investments  to  cash  flow.  According  to
heir  results,  the  higher  the  ex-ante  bankruptcy  costs,  the
ower  the  level  of  investment.
However,  these  studies  focus  their  attention  on  the  effect
hat  cash  flow  has  on  the  level  of  investment,  but  do  not
ake  into  account  other  different  behavior  of  companies
ith  insolvency  problems.  There  are  different  factors  that
an  explain  the  different  behavior  of  companies  in  financial
istress.  Firstly,  what  is  called  the  ‘‘punishment’’  effect  for
anagers,  which  encourages  them  to  make  decisions  with
he  purpose  of  preventing  the  firm  from  having  insolvency
roblems.  The  situation  in  which  managers  find  themselves
hen  their  firm  is  having  financial  problems  exercises  its
nfluence  on  the  manager’s  level  of  effort  (White,  1996),
ffecting  their  motivations  for  choosing  the  investment
rojects.
Secondly,  bankruptcy  laws  can  affect  the  financing  of
he  company,  which  can  affect  its  investment  capacity.  On
he  one  hand,  Davydenko  and  Franks  (2008)  and  Qian  and
trahan  (2007)  find  that  the  characteristics  of  bankruptcy
aws  are  a  determining  factor  of  financial  institutions’
ehavior  upon  financing  each  country’s  firms  (it  affects
ecovery  rates,  the  maturity  of  transactions  and  the  col-
ateral  required).  On  the  other  hand,  the  orientation  of  the
ankruptcy  laws  (debtor  or  creditor  oriented)  may  lead  to
uboptimal  investment  decisions  (López  Gutiérrez  et  al.,
012).  These  investment  problems  may  be  behind  the  low
ecovery  capacity  that  the  different  restructuring  proce-
ures  presented  (Couwenberg,  2001),  as  well  as  the  loss  of
alue  of  companies  in  distress  (López  Gutiérrez  et  al.,  2009).
Considering  all  these  factors,  from  a  theoretical  point
f  view,  the  very  fact  that  companies  are  in  financial
istress  can  exacerbate  the  problems  of  over-  and  under-
nvestment.  The  problems  of  under-investment  get  worse
ecause  shareholders  and  managers  have  no  incentive  to
ake  profitable  investments,  unless  in  doing  so,  they  can
ignificantly  reduce  the  probability  of  bankruptcy.  This  is
ecause  such  projects  reduce  the  variability  of  the  com-
any’s  returns,  only  improving  the  situation  of  creditors
White,  1996).  The  problems  of  over-investment  may  also
ncrease  in  companies  in  financial  distress,  with  managers
aving  strong  incentives  to  undertake  excessively  risky
nvestments.  If  the  project  is  successful,  it  avoids  or  at  least
s
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elays  the  entry  into  bankruptcy  proceedings,  while,  if  the
roject  fails,  the  creditors  bear  the  cost.
To  sum  up,  the  study  focuses  on  the  influence  of  financial
istress  on  the  investment  policy  of  the  company,  taking  into
ccount  the  investment  opportunities,  which  could  condi-
ion  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  in  distress.  On  the  one
and,  in  the  case  of  firms  with  fewer  investment  opportuni-
ies,  if  the  managers  expect  that  the  performance  of  those
nvestments  is  not  enough  to  avoid  bankruptcy,  they  have
trong  incentives  to  reject  projects  even  with  a  positive  net
resent  value.  This  leads  to  the  first  hypothesis:
1a.  Firms  with  fewer  investment  opportunities  present
reater  propensity  to  under-invest.
On  the  other  hand,  if  there  are  more  investment  oppor-
unities  that,  if  successful,  would  allow  the  firm  to  avoid
ankruptcy,  managers  could  make  very  risky  investments,
ven  with  negative  net  present  values,  since  they  benefit
rom  the  success  while  the  creditors  bear  the  cost  of  any
ailure.  Accordingly,  the  second  hypothesis  is
1b.  Firms  in  distress  with  greater  investment  opportuni-
ies  present  greater  propensity  to  over-invest.
ample
he  sample  includes  firms  from  Germany,  Canada,  Spain,
rance,  Italy,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.
he  inclusion  of  these  countries  allows  covering  companies
perating  under  different  institutional  environments  with  a
road  spectrum  of  bankruptcy  systems.  This  prevents  that
hese  circumstances  condition  the  analysis  by  controlling  for
he  country.
The  sample  consists  of  non-financial  listed  firms  between
996  and  2006.  We  restrict  the  sample  period  to  end  in  2006
o  that  our  results  are  not  affected  by  the  financial  crisis.
fter  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  firms’  financing
ehavior  could  be  conditioned  more  by  the  availability  of
unds  in  the  economy  and  the  disruption  of  the  financial
ystems  than  by  the  firms’  situation,  which  could  have  given
ise  to  a bias  in  our  results.
Each  country  presents  an  unbalanced  panel  made  up  of
ompanies  with  available  data  for  at  least  5  consecutive
ears.  This  condition  is  necessary  to  test  the  second  order
erial  correlation  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1991),  which  is  funda-
ental  for  guaranteeing  the  robustness  of  the  estimations
sing  the  System  GMM  methodology.
The  sample  consists  of  a  total  of  4029  companies
nd  31,010  observations.  Table  1  contains  the  temporal
nd  country  distribution  of  the  number  of  firms  of  the
ample.ize,  for  all  years  and  countries  analyzed,  is  adequate  for
erforming  the  analysis.  The  information  needed  to  carry
ut  the  analysis  comes  from  the  Datastream  database  of  the
homson  Financial  Services  Group.
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Table  1  Temporal  and  country  distribution.
Year  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Spain  UK  USA  Total
1996  81  131  191  56  42  349  981  1831
1997 98  141  198  60  45  370  1141  2053
1998 110  149  205  67  52  393  1270  2246
1999 118  156  223  73  54  474  1450  2548
2000 167  147  218  78  55  510  1670  2845
2001 190  245  267  118  61  538  1718  3137
2002 224  270  288  133  67  600  1825  3407
2003 255  293  316  154  73  630  1808  3529
2004 244  288  309  153  72  613  1699  3378
2005 237  260  302  145  69  591  1600  3204
2006 213  217  276  135  66  545  1380  2832
Number of  firms  (n)  279  332  378  159  77  676  2128  4029
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financial  distress  variable  (DIFit).
For  companies  in  financial  distress  and  fewer  investment
opportunities,  a  test  of  the  null  hypothesis  H0:  ˇ4 =  0  isTotal observations  (N)  1937  2297  2793  
Empirical method
To  test  for  the  influence  of  the  existence  of  financial  dis-
tress  on  the  investment  behavior  of  companies,  the  model
we  propose  follows  this  specification:
Model  1:(
I
Q
)
it
=  ˇ0 +  ˇ1CFit +  ˇ2SIZEit +  ˇ3LEVit
+  (ˇ4 +  ˇ5QDit)DIFit +
∑
j
jSECTORjit
+
∑
m
jCOUNTRYmit +
∑
k
kYEARkit +  εit
As  dependent  variable,  the  study  proposes  the  use  of
a  relative  variable  to  allow  the  analysis  of  the  effect
produced  on  under-investment  or  over-investment.  Tradi-
tionally,  studies  use  the  ratio  of  investment  to  replacement
value  of  the  firm’s  assets  (I/K),  but  this  does  not  directly
reflect  whether  the  company  is  over-  or  under-investing
according  to  the  available  investment  opportunities.  To
overcome  this  limitation,  the  study  proposes  the  use  of  the
classical  measures  of  the  level  of  investment  and  divides  it
by  the  investment  opportunities  as  measured  by  Tobin’s  q.
This  variable  has  a  series  of  advantages  over  others  com-
monly  used  in  literature,  since  it  allows  the  analysis  of
the  level  of  investment  relative  to  the  investment  oppor-
tunities  that  the  company  has.  A  positive  and  significant
coefficient  associated  with  one  of  the  independent  variables
implies  that  this  variable  promotes  the  existence  of  over-
investment,  while  a  negative  coefficient  reflects  a  greater
propensity  toward  under-investment.
To  introduce  the  financial  distress  situation  in  the  model,
we  define  a  dummy  variable  (DIF)  that  takes  value  1  when
the  company  is  in  financial  distress  and  zero  otherwise.  A
negative  coefficient  associated  to  this  variable  implies  that
the  firms  in  financial  difficulties  have  less  propensity  to
invest  than  healthy  firms,  taking  into  account  their  invest-
ment  opportunities.  To  identify  firms  in  financial  distress
the  study  uses  three  alternative  measures,  since  this  situ-
ation  is  not  directly  observable.  Thus,  the  results  are  more
s
t
P
1172  656  5613  16,542  31,010
obust  as  regards  the  identification  of  firms  in  distress  (see
ppendix).  The  first  measure  is  the  Z′′-Score  model  of  Altman
2002).  This  measure  is  a  modification  of  the  original  Z-Score
odel  (Altman,  1968),  which  was  developed  in  order  to  min-
mize  the  potential  industry  effect  and  is  used  to  assess  the
nancial  health  of  non-U.S.  corporates.  According  to  Altman
2002),  the  value  of  Z′′-score  has  the  following  intervals.  Val-
es  higher  than  2.6  are  considered  the  ‘‘safe  zone’’,  and
eans  that  the  possibility  of  bankruptcy  is  very  low.  Val-
es  between  1.1  and  2.6  are  considered  the  ‘‘gray  zone’’  or
‘zone  of  ignorance’’,  because  of  the  susceptibility  to  error
lassification.  Values  below  1.10  are  considered  ‘‘distress
one’’,  and  it  means  that  the  possibility  of  bankruptcy  is
igh.  So,  we  identify  firms  in  financial  distress  when  they  are
ituated  in  the  ‘‘distress  zone’’,  when  they  have  a  Z′′-score
ess  than  1.10  (DIF1).  Secondly,  firms  in  financial  distress
nclude  those  that,  in  a given  year,  have  a  lower  EBITDA  than
nancial  expenses  (DIF2)  (Bhagat  et  al.,  2005;  Wruck,  1990;
squith  et  al.,  1994;  Andrade  and  Kaplan,  1998;  Pindado
t  al.,  2008;  Whitaker,  1999).  The  last  measure  is  the  model
f  Ohlson  (1980), considering  a firm  to  be  in  financial  distress
n  a given  year  when  it  has  a  probability  of  default  greater
r  equal  to  50%  (DIF3).
In  addition,  the  investment  opportunities  that  exist  can
ondition  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  in  financial  dis-
ress.  To  include  this  constraint  in  the  analysis,  the  model
ncludes  a  dummy  variable  (QD)  that  takes  the  value  1 if
obin’s  q  is  greater  than  1  and  zero  otherwise.  This  vari-
ble  (QD)  allows  us  to  identify  companies  that  have  greater
nvestment  opportunities,  where  Tobin’s  q  is  greater  than
,  and  those  companies  with  fewer  opportunities  available,
hich  have  a  Tobin’s  q  of  less  than  1.3 This  dummy  vari-
ble  QD  is  introduced  into  the  model  interacting  with  the3 This variable is a good indicator of investment opportunities,
ince it reflects the market valuation of the capacity of the firm
o generate value according to their economic structure (Azofra
alenzuela et al., 2000).
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78  
ecessary.  If  this  null  hypothesis  is  rejected,  the  coeffi-
ient  ˇ4 is  statistically  different  from  zero  and  measures
he  sensitivity  of  the  propensity  to  invest  to  the  existence  of
nancial  distress  for  companies  with  few  investment  oppor-
unities.  The  introduction  of  the  interaction  variable  into
he  model  allows  us  to  test  the  situation  for  firms  that  have
reater  investment  opportunities.  In  order  to  interpret  the
nteraction  variables  correctly,  it  is  necessary  to  perform  a
inear  restriction  test  to  verify  the  significance  of  the  sums
f  the  coefficients.  The  null  hypothesis  is  H0:  ˇ4 +  ˇ5 =  0.
ejecting  this  null  hypothesis,  the  coefficient  (ˇ4 +  ˇ5)  is  sta-
istically  different  from  zero  and  measures  the  sensitivity  of
he  propensity  to  invest  to  the  existence  of  financial  distress
or  companies  with  greater  investment  opportunities.
To  investigate  the  relationship  between  investment  and
nancial  distress,  we  control  for  variables  that  affect  the
rms’  investment  behavior.  We  included  some  widely  con-
idered  factors  in  the  previous  literature:  the  internal  funds
enerated  for  each  firm  (CF)  (Fazzari  et  al.,  1988,  2000;
oshi  et  al.,  1991;  Lang  et  al.,  1996);  the  firm’s  size  (SIZE)
Kadapakkam  et  al.,  1998);  the  firm’s  leverage  (LEV) (Lang
t  al.,  1996);  and  the  firm’s  industry  (SECTOR)  (Hoshi  et  al.,
991).  Lastly,  country  and  year  effect  dummies  are  included
o  capture  country  and  year-specific  factors.
The  definition  of  the  variables  is  presented  in  the
ppendix.
The  model  is  estimated  using  panel  data  methodology.
his  allows  controlling  for  unobservable  heterogeneity.  The
ifferences  that  exist  between  the  companies  gives  rise
o  characteristics  that  influence  their  propensity  to  invest
hat  are  not  easily  observable  or  measurable  and  there-
ore  cannot  be  introduced  into  a  model.  The  use  of  panel
ata  allows  controlling  for  this  heterogeneity  by  taking
he  first  differences  and  thereby  eliminating  the  individ-
al  effect,  which  allows  avoiding  any  bias  in  the  results.
n  particular,  the  models  are  estimated  using  two  steps
ystem-GMM  (Generalized  Method  of  Moments)  with  robust
rrors,  which  is  consistent  in  the  presence  of  any  pat-
ern  of  heteroscedasticity  and  autocorrelation  (Arellano
nd  Bover,  1995;  Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  This  estima-
or  allows  controlling  for  problems  of  endogeneity  by  using
nstruments.  In  particular,  the  model  includes  the  lagged
xplanatory  variables  as  instruments,  which  allows  for  addi-
ional  instruments  by  taking  advantage  of  the  conditions
f  orthogonality  existing  between  the  lags  in  the  indepen-
ent  variables  of  the  model  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1991).
he  CF,  SIZE  and  LEV  variables  are  considered  endogenous
ecause  these  variables  could  be  affected  by  the  invest-
ent  decisions.  The  financial  distress  variable  is  considered
xogenous  because  investment  has  not  been  included  as  an
xplanatory  variable  of  financial  distress  in  the  literature
Mossman  et  al.,  1998;  Altman  and  Hotchkiss,  2006).  For  the
ndogenous  variables,  first  or  deeper  lags  have  been  used
s  instruments.  The  exogenous  variable  is  instrumented  by
tself.mpirical evidence
his  section  describes  basic  characteristics  of  the  data,  dis-
usses  the  results  of  our  empirical  analyses  in  some  detail,
nd  presents  some  robustness  tests.
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ata  description
utlier  identification  is  important  in  many  applications  of
ultivariate  analysis  in  order  to  preserve  the  results  from
ossible  harmful  effects  (Santos-Pereira  and  Pires,  2002).
o  ensure  that  the  results  are  not  driven  by  outliers,  we
emove  observations  with  extreme  values  for  our  control
ariables.  This  allows  avoiding  bias  in  our  results.  So,  we
pplied  the  following  filters:  (1)  we  remove  firms  with
obin’s  q  over  20;  (2)  we  remove  firms  with  I  greater  than  2
r  smaller  than  −2;  (3)  we  remove  firms  with  CF/K  greater
han  2  or  smaller  than  −2.
Tables  2--4  provide  descriptive  statistics  for  the  sample,
istinguishing  among  the  firms  classified  according  to  the
hree  alternative  methods  described  above.  The  sample  size
hen  using  the  Ohlson  model  is  smaller  due  to  the  lower
vailability  of  the  data  required  for  the  calculation.  We  also
ompare  the  firms  with  Tobin’s  q  over  or  under  one,  in  order
o  test  the  differences  according  to  this  variable.  Addition-
lly,  we  present  the  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  test,  comparing  the
ean  of  the  two  subsamples  in  each  case.
Table  2  provides  descriptive  statistics  for  the  whole
ample.  All  the  differences  are  statistically  significant.  All
ariables  present  higher  values  for  firms  with  Q  over  one,
xcept  the  dependent  variable  of  our  model  (I/Q)  which  is
igher  for  firms  with  Q  under  one.
Table  3  provides  information  for  all  variables  distinguish-
ng  healthy  and  financially  distressed  firms.  The  results  show
hat  financially  distressed  firms  invest  less,  have  a  higher
obin’s  q,  smaller  cash  flows,  a  smaller  size  and  higher
everage  than  healthy  firms.  These  results  follow  the  same
attern  as  Bhagat  et  al.  (2005).  The  greater  value  of  Tobin’s
 for  firms  in  financial  distress  could  affect  the  behavior
f  our  dependent  variable.  In  fact,  regarding  the  variable
/Q,  the  results  show  that  distressed  firms  present  a  smaller
alue,  so  they  seem  not  to  be  able  to  take  advantage  of
ll  the  investment  opportunities  they  have,  at  least  not  in
he  same  way  that  healthy  firms  do.  So,  greater  values  of
obin’s  q  lead  to  greater  denominator  values  and  a  tendency
o  underinvestment,  as  we  detected  in  the  results  presented
n  Table  2.
Lastly,  there  is  a  need  for  in-depth  analysis  so,  in  Table  4,
e  present  the  differences  for  firms  with  q  over  and  under
ne,  for  both  healthy  and  distressed  firms.  In  the  case  of
ealthy  firms,  the  results  are  similar  to  those  previously
btained  for  the  whole  sample,  presented  in  Table  2  (higher
alues  for  all  the  variables  except  I/Q  for  firms  with  Q  over
ne).  However,  for  financially  distressed  firms  the  behav-
or  of  the  variable  I/Q  is  not  the  same,  since  we  do  not
bserve  statistically  significant  differences  between  firms
ith  Tobin’s  q  over  and  under  one.
These  results  suggest  that  healthy  and  distressed  firms
ave  different  investment  behavior,  but  we  need  to  test
hese  findings  with  multivariable  analysis  in  order  to  take
nto  account  all  the  variables  that  might  affect  this  behavior.
esultsable  5  According  to  Hypothesis  1a,  coefficient  ˇ4 should
e  negative,  reflecting  that  the  firms  in  distress  with  fewer
nvestment  opportunities  reduce  the  level  of  investment
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elative  to  the  investment  opportunities.  The  results  show  a
tatistically  significant  negative  relationship  between  finan-
ial  distress  and  the  relative  investment  for  firms  that
ave  fewer  investment  opportunities  (ˇ4 is  negative  and
tatistically  different  from  zero).  In  this  way,  firms  in  finan-
ial  distress  with  fewer  investment  opportunities  present  a
reater  propensity  to  under-invest.  According  to  Hypothesis
b, the  sum  of  coefficients  (ˇ4 +  ˇ5) should  be  positive,
eflecting  that  the  firms  in  distress  with  greater  invest-
ent  opportunities  increase  the  level  of  investment  relative
o  the  investment  opportunities.  However,  the  significance
est  of  the  sum  of  coefficients  of  the  interaction  varia-
les  (ˇ4 +  ˇ5)  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Thus,
ompanies  in  financial  distress  which  have  more  investment
pportunities  show  an  investment  behavior  that  is  not  sig-
ificantly  different  from  that  of  healthy  companies.  This
ssumes  that  they  do  not  over-invest,  but  their  invest-
ent  behavior  differs  from  that  of  the  other  companies
n  financial  distress.  Specifically,  for  those  companies  with
reater  opportunities,  the  tendency  to  under-invest  disap-
ears,  while  this  tendency  remains  for  firms  with  fewer
nvestment  opportunities.
These  results  are  partially  consistent  with  the  theoret-
cal  proposals  of  White  (1996), who  defended  that  firms
n  financial  distress  could  have  problems  of  over-  and
nder-investment.  Some  papers  have  addressed  this  issue
ndirectly,  finding  under-investment  problems  under  differ-
nt  circumstances:  when  ex-ante  bankruptcy  costs  exists
Pindado  et  al.,  2008)  or  for  financially  distressed  firms  if
hey  operate  at  a  loss  (Bhagat  et  al.,  2005).  Our  results
dd  additional  evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  this  invest-
ent  behavior  of  financially  distressed  firms  is  conditioned
y  their  own  investment  opportunities.  In  fact,  our  findings
upport  under-investment  but  not  over-investment  behav-
or.
Regarding  the  control  variables,  the  results  show  a  pos-
tive  and  statistically  significant  relationship  for  cash  flow
CF)  in  models  in  columns  (2)  and  (3)  of  Table  5,  so  that
rms  with  higher  cash  flow  have  a  greater  propensity  to
ver-invest  (Jensen,  1986).  Lastly,  we  find  that  in  models
n  columns  (1)  and  (3)  of  Table  5  there  is  a  negative  rela-
ionship  between  leverage  and  the  level  of  investment.  This
esult  is  similar  to  that  obtained  by  Lang  et  al.  (1996),  who
ound  that  there  is  a  negative  relation  between  leverage  and
uture  growth  of  the  firms.
shows  the  results  of  the  analysis  proposed  in  model  1.
These  results  are  in  line  with  the  proposition  of  this
tudy,  showing  that  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  in  dis-
ress  can  be  conditioned  by  their  investment  opportunities.
hus,  firms  with  fewer  opportunities  have  a  propensity  to
nder-invest,  showing  how  managers  tend  to  forego  prof-
table  projects  if  it  will  not  provide  a  result  sufficient  to
voiding  bankruptcy.  However,  this  situation  does  not  hold
n  the  case  of  companies  with  more  opportunities,  since  in
his  case  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  in  distress  is  no
ifferent  from  that  of  healthy  companies.obustness  tests
n  order  to  control  the  robustness  of  the  results,  we  perform
wo  complementary  analyses.
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Table  3  Descriptive  statistics  II.
Distressed  firms  (DIF1)  Healthy  firms  (DIF1)
N  (n) 4404  (1470) 26,606  (3917)
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Z  Sig.
I 0.063  0.171  −1.398  0.751  0.078  0.113  −1.842  0.918  7.81 ***
Q  2.364  2.023  0.305  18.460  2.136  1.741  0.039  19.903  −7.60 ***
Num  Q  7183  42,200  0.354  960,000  4371  17,300  0.512  475,000  10.36 ***
K  3477  15,000  0.053  252,000  1997  7282  0.814  220,000  12.62 ***
I/Q  0.032  0.125  −1.332  1.077  0.048  0.093  −5.626  1.551  12.32 ***
CF  0.043  0.319  −1.918  1.959  0.123  0.205  −1.887  1.903  22.11 ***
SIZE  5.351  1.095  1.769  8.754  5.501  0.871  2.870  8.432  11.53 ***
LEV  0.802  0.377  0.016  9.681  0.513  0.203  0.003  2.546  −62.65 ***
Distressed  firms  (DIF2)  Healthy  firms  (DIF2)
N  (n)  4868  (1770)  26,142  (3823)
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Z  Sig.
I 0.044  0.160  −1.371  0.836  0.082  0.114  −1.842  0.918  27.33 ***
Q  2.607  2.327  0.039  18.683  2.086  1.652  0.072  19.903  −11.64 ***
Num  Q  880  5254  0.354  147,000  5495  24,400  0.904  960,000  50.18 ***
K  477  2699  0.053  80,300  2530  9506  0.814  252,000  56.36 ***
I/Q  0.018  0.147  −5.626  1.451  0.051  0.085  −1.602  1.551  32.70 ***
CF  −0.141  0.356  −1.918  1.959  0.159  0.152  −1.838  1.903  76.14 ***
SIZE  4.822  0.771  1.769  8.065  5.602  0.878  2.870  8.754  55.88 ***
LEV  0.560  0.401  0.003  9.681  0.553  0.219  0.004  3.599  6.81 ***
Distressed  firms  (DIF3)  Healthy  firms  (DIF3)
N  (n)  2437  (988)  23,100  (2845)
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max  Z  Sig.
I 0.040  0.163  −1.398  0.742  0.078  0.112  −1.816  0.832  16.54 ***
Q  2.634  2.443  0.193  18.683  2.066  1.602  0.039  19.875  −8.28 ***
Num  Q  900  4802  1.251  134,000  5827  25,600  0.512  960,000  37.09 ***
K  484  2806  0.579  72,400  2673  9774  1.207  252,000  41.63 ***
I/Q  0.016  0.166  −5.626  1.077  0.049  0.086  −1.602  1.551  20.07 ***
CF  −0.046  0.366  −1.796  1.959  0.141  0.168  −1.824  1.894  33.64 ***
SIZE  4.860 0.771  2.782  7.965  5.643  0.864  3.122  8.754  41.15 ***
LEV  0.739 0.469  0.006  9.681  0.539  0.205  0.003  2.392  −26.85 ***
Z is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
*** A level of significance of 0.01.
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In  the  first  one  we  test  model  1,  but  dividing  the  sample
ccording  to  the  value  of  the  Tobin’s  q  instead  of  using  an
nteraction  term.  So,  we  test  the  model  considering  firms
ith  Q  values  over  and  under  one,  and  with  Q  values  over
nd  under  the  median  value  of  Q.  The  model  follows  this
pecification:
Model  2:
I
Q
)
it
=  ˇ0 +  ˇ1CFit +  ˇ2SIZEit +  ˇ3LEVit +  ˇ4DIFit
∑ ∑+
j
jSECTORjit +
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∑
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Using  this  alternative  specification,  we  prevent  our
esults  from  being  biased  due  to  the  introduction  of  an
nteraction  term  of  two  dichotomous  variables  (QD  and  DIF)
n  the  original  model  (model  1).  In  this  case,  we  use  OLS
stimation  using  the  Huber/White/sandwich  estimator  of
he  variance--covariance  matrix,  so  the  test  is  robust  to  an
nspecified  form  of  heteroscedasticity.  We  have  to  use  OLS
ecause  we  split  the  sample  in  two  different  parts,  so  we  do
ot  have  consecutive  observations  for  all  firms.  If  GMM  panel
ata  were  used,  we  could  only  analyze  firms  with  at  least
ve  consecutive  years  with  Q  over  or  under  one  (or  under  or
ver  the  median)  in  each  case.  Table  6  provides  the  results
f  these  analyses.
The  results  are  in  line  with  those  obtained  in  our  previ-
us  analysis.  Table  6  shows  how  the  influence  of  the  variable
IF  varies  according  to  the  value  of  Tobin’s  q.  The  value  of
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Table  4  Descriptive  statistics  III.
Distressed firms (DIF1) Q > 1 Distressed firms (DIF1) Q < 1 Healthy firms (DIF1) Q > 1 Healthy firms (DIF1) Q < 1
N (n) 3879 (1348) 525 (291) 22,378 (3744) 4228 (1289)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig.
I 0.068 0.168 −1.398 0.751 0.021 0.188 −0.992 0.742 −7.67 *** 0.082 0.112 −1.842 0.918 0.055 0.112 −1.438 0.820 −18.64 ***
Q 2.568 2.073 1.000 18.460 0.858 0.126 0.305 0.999 −37.24 *** 2.384 1.791 1.000 19.903 0.819 0.147 0.039 1.000 −103.29 ***
Num Q 7986 44,900 0.354 960,000 1249 3792 1.156 30,900 −10.58 *** 5067 18,700 1.677 475,000 685 2985 0.512 62,900 −48.97 ***
K 3760 15,900 0.053 252,000 1392 4141 1.285 32,300 −2.44 ** 2230 7798 0.814 220,000 767 3177 1.897 65,700 −24.41 ***
I/Q 0.033 0.099 −1.077 0.631 0.021 0.239 −1.332 1.077 −0.32 0.044 0.069 −0.998 0.808 0.067 0.169 −5.626 1.551 19.58 ***
CF 0.043 0.330 −1.918 1.959 0.047 0.221 −1.602 1.105 −5.13 *** 0.136 0.209 −1.887 1.903 0.056 0.167 −1.713 0.728 −45.41 ***
SIZE 5.384 1.116 1.769 8.754 5.105 0.883 3.122 7.471 −4.99 *** 5.568 0.880 2.870 8.432 5.144 0.727 3.261 7.812 −29.73 ***
LEV 0.817 0.391 0.025 9.681 0.687 0.212 0.016 1.477 −8.22 *** 0.517 0.205 0.004 2.546 0.491 0.192 0.003 1.012 −6.70 ***
Distressed firms (DIF2) Q > 1 Distressed firms (DIF2) Q < 1 Healthy firms (DIF2) Q > 1 Healthy firms (DIF2) Q < 1
N 4049 (1553) 819 (523) 22,208 (3643) 3934 (1200)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig.
I 0.051 0.156 −1.371 0.836 0.009 0.175 −1.087 0.812 −10.71 *** 0.086 0.114 −1.842 0.918 0.060 0.108 −1.438 0.820 −6.22 ***
Q 2.976 2.387 1.000 18.683 0.783 0.160 0.039 1.000 −45.20 *** 2.309 1.697 1.000 19.903 0.831 0.140 0.072 1.000 −16.93 ***
Num Q 979 5703 0.354 147,000 393 1748 0.512 14,600 −16.10 *** 6323 26,400 1.677 960,000 821 3296 0.904 62,900 −100.13 ***
K 479 2815 0.053 80,300 467 2034 1.387 17,800 1.61 2816 10,200 0.814 252,000 912 3505 1.285 65,700 −47.60 ***
I/Q 0.021 0.088 −1.077 0.730 0.006 0.300 −5.626 1.451 −0.19 0.047 0.071 −1.049 0.808 0.074 0.138 −1.602 1.551 −25.40 ***
CF −0.152 0.367 −1.918 1.959 −0.085 0.288 −1.713 1.105 4.30 *** 0.172 0.153 −1.838 1.903 0.084 0.120 −1.710 1.078 20.81 ***
SIZE 4.830 0.783 1.769 8.065 4.781 0.706 3.143 7.185 −1.17 5.671 0.884 2.870 8.754 5.214 0.732 3.122 7.812 −49.92 ***
LEV 0.579 0.424 0.004 9.681 0.468 0.235 0.003 1.477 −6.22 *** 0.558 0.223 0.005 3.599 0.522 0.195 0.004 1.449 −30.95 ***
Distressed firms (DIF3) Q >  1 Distressed firms (DIF3) Q < 1 Healthy firms (DIF3) Q > 1 Healthy firms (DIF3) Q < 1
N 2062 (862) 375  (249) 19,497 (2730) 3603 (992)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Z Sig.
I 0.046 0.160 −1.398 0.732 0.007 0.178 −1.087 0.742 −5.59 *** 0.083 0.112 −1.816 0.832 0.055 0.112 −1.438 0.820 −17.53 ***
Q 2.961 2.521 1.000 18.683 0.835 0.144 0.193 0.999 −30.85 *** 2.296 1.642 1.000 19.875 0.820 0.147 0.039 1.000 −95.51 ***
Num Q 960 5103 2.275 134,000 571 2559 1.251 30,900 −8.08 *** 6745 27,700 1.990 960,000 858 3363 0.512 62,900 −47.63 ***
K 457 2814 0.579 72,400 633 2763 2.707 32,300 2.25 ** 2989 10,500 1.207 252,000 960 3598 1.285 65,700 −26.11 ***
I/Q 0.020 0.094 −0.929 0.631 −0.007 0.361 −5.626 1.077 0.81 0.045 0.070 −1.077 0.664 0.068 0.144 −1.602 1.551 17.68 ***
CF −0.056 0.379 −1.796 1.959 0.007 0.280 −1.694 1.105 1.71 * 0.154 0.171 −1.824 1.894 0.070 0.135 −1.713 0.728 −45.34 ***
SIZE 4.860 0.775 2.782 7.965 4.860 0.748 3.392 7.471 0.14 5.717 0.868 3.145 8.754 5.241 0.726 3.122 7.812 −31.16 ***
LEV 0.760 0.497 0.019 9.681 0.626 0.237 0.006 1.263 −4.95 *** 0.545 0.207 0.004 2.392 0.507 0.192 0.003 1.012 −9.13 ***
* A level of significance of 0.1.
** A level of significance of 0.05.
*** A level of significance of 0.01.
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Table  5  Results  of  panel  data  analysis.
(1)  (2)  (3)
Dependent variable  I/Q  I/Q  I/Q
CF  0.0501  0.1033* 0.0667**
(0.88)  (1.66)  (2.01)
SIZE −0.0182  −0.0488  −0.0015
(−0.46) (−0.89)  (−0.04)
LEV −0.0473* −0.0465  −0.0667*
(−1.92)  (−0.76)  (−1.87)
DIF1 −0.2294**
(−2.50)
DIF2 −0.1429**
(−2.46)
DIF3 −0.1356**
(−2.00)
DIF1*QD  0.2181**
(2.22)
DIF2*QD  0.1389**
(2.40)
DIF3*QD  0.1308*
(1.74)
CONSTANT 0.3371  0.3062  0.0991
(1.48) (0.65)  (0.49)
ˇ4 +  ˇ5 −0.0113  −0.0039  −0.0048
(−0.66) (−0.23)  (−0.37)
SECTOR 5.23*** 1.33  0.63
COUNTRY 0.42  0.65  0.63
YEAR 8.29*** 1.64* 53.62***
m1 −4.42*** −3.85*** −4.54***
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]
m2 −0.28  0.17  −0.93
[0.782]  [0.863]  [0.353]
Hansen 19.57  7.25  36.41
[0.240]  [0.993]  [0.309]
ˇ4 + ˇ5: is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the following null hypothesis: H0: ˇ4 + ˇ5 = 0.
SECTOR: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the sector’s dummy variables. COUNTRY: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the
country’s dummy variables. YEAR: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the year’s dummy variables. Distributed as a chi-square under
the null hypothesis of lack of relationship.
m1 and m2 are the 1st and 2nd order serial correlation statistics using residuals in first differences, distributed as N(0,1) under the null
hypothesis of non-serial correlation.
Hansen: over-identifying restriction test, distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of no relation between the instruments
and the error term.
t-Statistic between brackets and p-values between square brackets.
* A level of significance of 0.1.
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** A level of significance of 0.05.
*** A level of significance of 0.01.
he  coefficient  associated  with  this  variable  is  negative  and
ignificant  for  both  firms  with  Q  values  over  and  under  one.
owever,  this  negative  effect  is  much  more  intense  for  firms
ith  Tobin’s  q  under  1  (the  coefficients  are  from  2  to  6  times
ore  intense  depending  on  the  model).  When  we  divide
rms  according  to  the  median,  the  differences  are  even  big-
er  (in  this  case,  even  the  DIF1 variable  is  not  significant  for
rms  with  Q  values  over  the  median).  According  to  these
esults,  firms  in  financial  distress  with  fewer  investment
pportunities  present  a  greater  propensity  to  under-invest,
s  we  showed  in  our  previous  panel  data  analysis.
The  second  robustness  analysis  is  performed  using  the
raditional  measure  of  investment  over  replacement  value
i
g
g
I
f  assets  (I)  as  dependent  variable,  dividing  the  sample  in
rms  with  I/Q  over  and  under  the  median  of  their  industry.
his  complementary  analysis  allows  us  to  control  that  our
esults  are  not  biased  by  the  way  we  measure  the  firm’s
nvestment,  I/Q,  a  new  measure  proposed  in  this  paper.
o,  we  propose  the  estimation  of  the  following  model,
sing  the  traditional  measure  of  investment  over  replace-
ent  value  of  assets  (I),  and  controlling  the  over  and
nderinvestment  situations  using  two  subsamples:  one  that
ncludes  firms  with  a  greater  tendency  to  overinvest,  with
reater  values  of  I/Q  and  the  other  that  includes  firms  with
reater  a  tendency  to  underinvest,  with  smaller  values  of
/Q.
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Table  6  Robustness  test  (sample  divided  according  to  Tobin’s  q).
Model  1  (Q  >  1) Model  1  (Q  <  1) Model  1  (Q  >  median) Model  1  (Q  <  median)
Dependent variable I/Q I/Q I/Q I/Q
Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef
CF  0.0137*** 0.0020  0.0120*** 0.1542*** 0.1306** 0.2153*** 0.0087*** 0.0024  0.0060** 0.1021*** 0.0835*** 0.1400***
(5.14)  (0.66)  (3.78)  (2.95)  (2.42)  (3.01)  (3.75)  (0.86)  (2.37)  (4.51)  (3.56)  (4.52)
SIZE 0.0026*** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0100** 0.0099** 0.0104* 0.0023*** 0.0014*** 0.0011** 0.0046*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*
(4.98)  (2.53)  (2.27)  (2.53)  (2.45)  (1.93)  (4.81)  (2.81)  (2.01)  (3.50)  (2.65)  (1.96)
LEV 0.0024  0.0002  0.0040* 0.0143  −0.0079 0.0206  −0.0014 −0.0011 0.0004  −0.0013 −0.0101 0.0065
(1.10) (0.09)  (1.82)  (0.66)  (−0.39) (0.67)  (−0.80) (−0.67) (0.24)  (−0.15) (−1.23) (0.55)
DIF1 −0.0069*** −0.0411*** −0.0009 −0.0187***
(−3.88) (−3.63) (−0.54) (−4.63)
DIF2 −0.0189*** −0.0372*** −0.0101*** −0.0270***
(−10.64) (−3.66) (−5.81) (−5.88)
DIF3 −0.0168*** −0.0527*** −0.0113*** −0.0306***
(−7.08) (−2.71) (−5.29) (−3.95)
CONSTANT  0.0352*** 0.0468*** 0.0431*** −0.0065  0.0087  −0.0077  0.0266*** 0.0340*** 0.0359*** 0.0352*** 0.0486*** 0.0350***
(10.97)  (14.08)  (12.14)  (−0.37)  (0.48)  (−0.39)  (8.99)  (10.91)  (11.09)  (5.17)  (7.14)  (4.79)
SECTOR 20.40*** 16.15*** 21.43*** 8.04*** 9.34*** 3.72** 16.55*** 13.19*** 10.87*** 10.08*** 13.00*** 5.86***
COUNTRY  33.63*** 29.46*** 22.06*** 5.67*** 6.65*** 4.38*** 24.96*** 23.51*** 15.90*** 6.10*** 5.64*** 3.32***
YEAR  151.49*** 146.12*** 147.80*** 26.58*** 27.21*** 29.22*** 83.16*** 80.83*** 88.11*** 89.78*** 90.95*** 89.97***
R2 0.07  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.10
F 89.23*** 94.25*** 86.28*** 19.16*** 18.93*** 18.36*** 51.16*** 52.65*** 51.48*** 54.57*** 55.07*** 52.04***
SECTOR: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the sector’s dummy variables. COUNTRY: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the country’s dummy variables. YEAR: Wald’s test of the
joint.
Significance of the year’s dummy variables. Distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of lack of relationship.
t-Statistic between brackets.
* A level of significance of 0.1.
** A level of significance of 0.05.
*** A level of significance of 0.01.
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Table  7  Robustness  test  (sample  divided  according  to  the  over  and  under  investment  intensity).
Model  1  (I/Q  >  industry)  Model  1  (I/Q  <  industry)
Dependent variable  I  I
Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef
CF  0.0050  0.0220*** 0.0163* 0.0619*** 0.0593*** 0.0776***
(0.73)  (2.95)  (1.92)  (8.74)  (7.24)  (9.10)
SIZE 0.0038*** 0.0042*** 0.0071*** 0.0044*** 0.0049*** 0.0046***
(3.54)  (3.88)  (6.28)  (4.37)  (4.87)  (4.14)
LEV 0.0105** 0.0300*** 0.0215*** −0.0162*** −0.0290*** −0.0255***
(2.14)  (6.40)  (4.60)  (−3.58)  (−6.75)  (−6.38)
DIF1 0.0350*** −0.0244***
(11.27)  (−7.23)
DIF2 0.0317*** −0.0077**
(8.26)  (−2.28)
DIF3 0.0247*** −0.0109**
(5.87)  (−2.46)
CONSTANT  0.1076*** 0.0934*** 0.0858*** 0.0173*** 0.0207*** 0.0197***
(17.46)  (15.01)  (13.16)  (3.09)  (3.68)  (3.30)
SECTOR 17.02*** 11.87*** 12.76*** 32.05*** 30.22*** 16.85***
COUNTRY 82.70*** 81.79*** 85.82*** 3.13*** 3.80*** 5.84***
YEAR  7.79*** 7.39*** 11.02*** 41.35*** 42.93*** 44.40***
R2 0.06  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.09
F 39.56*** 35.86*** 38.14*** 34.75*** 34.68*** 35.02***
SECTOR: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the sector’s dummy variables. COUNTRY: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the
country’s dummy variables. YEAR: Wald’s test of the joint significance of the year’s dummy variables. Distributed as a chi-square under
the null hypothesis of lack of relationship.
t-Statistic between brackets.
* A level of significance of 0.1.
** A level of significance of 0.05.
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*** A level of significance of 0.01.
Model  34:
I)it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1CFit +  ˇ2SIZEit +  ˇ3LEVit +  ˇ4DIFit
+
∑
j
jSECTORjit +
∑
m
jCOUNTRYmit
+
∑
k
kYEARkit +  εit
able  7  provides  the  results  of  these  analyses.
Table  7  shows  the  influence  of  financial  distress  over
nvestment  (using  I  as  dependent  variable)  for  firms  accord-
ng  to  their  tendency  to  over  or  under  invest  (i.e.
istinguishing  whether  their  I/Q  values  are  over  or  under
he  median  of  their  industry).  The  results  show  that,  in  the
roup  of  firms  with  smaller  investment  values  over  Q,  the
ariable  DIF  is  negative  and  significant,  so  financially  dis-
ressed  firms  in  this  group  present  a  greater  propensity  to
nder-invest.  However,  for  the  group  of  firms  with  I/Q  over
he  industry  median,  the  variable  DIF  is  positive  and  statisti-
ally  significant,  so  in  this  group  financially  distressed  firms
resent  a  greater  propensity  to  overinvest.
4 We have to use OLS again, because in this case we have to divide
he sample in two subsamples according to their I/Q.
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onclusions
his  paper  analyzes  the  influence  of  financial  distress  on
he  investment  behavior  of  companies.  The  study  analyzes
he  different  behavior  of  firms  in  financial  distress,  taking
nto  account  the  differences  that  may  occur  among  com-
anies  in  financial  distress  depending  on  their  investment
pportunities.
The  results  show  that  the  investment  behavior  is  not
niform  for  all  companies  facing  financial  distress,  and
he  propensity  to  under-invest  depends  on  the  investment
pportunities  available  to  the  company.  Thus,  firms  with
reater  opportunities  that  believe  that  the  additional  invest-
ents  can  help  them  to  overcome  their  difficulties  do  not
how  differences  with  respect  to  the  investment  behavior  of
ealthy  firms  when  it  comes  to  taking  advantage  of  invest-
ent  opportunities.  However,  managers  of  companies  with
ewer  investment  opportunities  have  a  greater  propensity
o  under-invest  because  they  only  implement  projects  that
hey  consider  may  prevent  the  company  from  having  to  file
or  bankruptcy.  This  behavior  makes  them  miss  profitable
pportunities  that  would  help  improve  the  situation  of  the
ompany  in  distress.This  helps  to  explain  why  the  reorganization  processes
ndertaken  by  many  firms  in  distress  are  often  unable  to
revent  their  demise.  In  this  sense,  the  results  are  partic-
larly  relevant  at  the  present  time,  in  light  of  the  reforms
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A.6.  Financial  distress  identification
A.6.1.  Altman’s  Z′′-Score  model
The  first  financial  distress  variable  (DIF1)  is  based  on  Alt-
′′ ′′Investment  decisions  of  companies  in  financial  distress  
that  have  occurred  in  bankruptcy  laws  in  different  countries,
and  the  economic  crisis,  which  has  increased  the  number  of
insolvencies  worldwide.
Moreover,  future  extension  of  this  work  could  study  the
effect  that  the  way  firms  deal  with  financial  distress  has
on  their  investment  behavior.  On  the  one  hand,  it  might
be  relevant  if  firms  follow  an  informal  procedure  or  file  for
bankruptcy  (Aybar  Arias  et  al.,  2006;  Gilson,  1997;  González
and  González,  2000).  On  the  other  hand,  firms  filing  for
bankruptcy  are  affected  by  different  insolvency  procedures,
because  bankruptcy  laws  vary  across  countries  (Davydenko
and  Franks,  2008;  López  Gutiérrez  et  al.,  2012).
Appendix.
A.1.  Tobin’s  q
We  calculate  this  ratio  following  Pindado  et  al.  (2008). They
propose  different  adjustments  to  improve  this  measure’s
precision.
Qit = MVEit +  MVLTDit +  BVSTDit
Kit
--  MVE: market  value  of  equity
--  MVLTD:  market  value  of  long-term  debt.
MVLTD  =
[
1  +  lit
1  +  il
]
BVLTD
To  obtain  it,  we  use  the  cost  of  the  firm’s  long-term  debt
(lit)  and  the  market’s  long-term  interest  rates  (il).  We,
therefore,  attain  a  better  approximation  to  the  firm’s  total
market  value  than  using  the  book  value  of  long-term  debt
(BVLTD).
--  BVSTD: book  value  of  short-term  debt
--  K:  replacement  value  of  capital.
Kit =  RFit +  (TAit −  BFit)
where  TAit is  the  book  value  of  total  assets,  BFit the  book
value  of  fixed  assets  and  RFit is  the  replacement  value  of
fixed  assets,  calculated  as  follows:
RFit =  RFit−1
[
1  +  t
1  +  ıit
]
+  Iit
We  use  the  depreciation  of  firm’s  assets  (ıit),  the  price  index
variation  information  (it)  and  the  firm’s  investment  (Iit)  to
calculate  it.  This  makes  it  possible  to  improve  the  approx-
imation  that  entails  considering  the  replacement  cost  as
equal  to  the  book  value  of  the  firm’s  assets.
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.2.  Investment
he  level  of  investment  is  measured  as  follows:
it = Invit
Kit
Investment  is  measured  as  fixed  assets  variation  between
eriod  t  and  t  −  1,  following  this  expression:
nvit =  NFAit −  NFAit−1 +  Dit
-  NFA: net  fixed  assets.
-  D:  depreciation  expenses.
-  K:  replacement  value  of  capital.
This  measure  allows  us  to  control  both  investment  and
ivestment  of  distressed  firms.
.3.  Cash  flows
ash  flow  is  measured  as  earnings  before  interest,  taxes,
epreciation  and  amortization  (EBITDA)  over  the  replace-
ent  value  of  the  firm’s  assets:
Fit = EBITDAit
Kit
.4.  Firms’  size
irms’  size  is  measured  by  the  natural  logarithm  of  total
ssets:
IZEit =  LN(TAit)
.5.  Firms’  leverage
egree  of  the  firm’s  leverage  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of
otal  debt  over  total  assets:
EVit = BVLTDit +  BVSTDit
TAitan’s  Z -Score  model  (Altman,  2002). The  Z -Score  model
s:
′′ =  6.56  ∗  X1 +  3.26  ∗  X2 +  6.72  ∗  X3 +  1.05  ∗  X4
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-  X1:  working  capital  to  total  assets
-  X2:  retained  earnings  to  total  assets
- X3:  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes  to  total  assets
-  X4:  market  value  equity  to  book  value  of  total  liabilities
We  identify  firms  in  financial  distress  when  they  have  Z′′-
cores  below  1.10.
.6.2.  Financial  distress  ratio
he  second  financial  distress  variable  (DIF2)  is  based  on  the
nancial  distress  ratio  (FDR):
DRit = EBITDAit
FEit
-  EBITDA:  earnings  before  interest,  taxes,  depreciation  and
amortization
-  FE:  financial  expenses
We  consider  firms  to  be  in  financial  distress  when  they
ave  a  financial  distress  ratio  below  1.
.6.3.  Ohlson’s  model
he  third  financial  distress  variable  (DIF3) is  based  on
hlson’s  predicted  bankruptcy  probabilities,  p  (Ohlson,
980).
 = 1
1  +  e−yit
it =  −1.32  −  0.407  ∗  SIZE  +  6.03  ∗  TLTA  −  1.43  ∗  WCTA
+  0.757  ∗  CLCA  −  2.37  ∗  NITA  −  1.83  ∗  FUTL
+  0.285  ∗  INTWO  −  1.72  ∗  OENEG  −  0.521CHIN
-  SIZE: log  of  total  assets  to  GNP  price-level  index  ratio
-  TLTA: total  liabilities  to  total  assets
-  WCTA: working  capital  to  total  assets
-  CLCA: current  liabilities  to  current  assets
-  NITA: net  income  to  total  assets
- FUTL: funds  from  operations  to  total  liabilities
-  INTWO:  is  equal  to  one  in  net  income  is  negative  in  the
previous  2  years  or  zero  otherwise
-  OENEG:  is  equal  to  one  if  total  liabilities  are  greater  than
total  assets  or  zero  otherwise
-  CHIN  =  (NIt −  NIt−1)/(|NIt|  −  |NIt−1|)  where  NIt is  the  net
income  for  year  tWe  identify  firms  in  financial  distress  when  the
ankruptcy  probability  is  greater  than  or  equal  to  50%.
.7.  Firms’  sector
ECTOR  are  a  set  of  dummy  variables  that  identify  the  busi-
ess  activity  sector.
G
H
C.  López-Gutiérrez  et  al.
.8.  Firms’  country
OUNTRY  are  a  set  of  dummy  variables  that  identify  the
ountry.
.9.  Year
EAR  are  a set  of  dummy  variables  that  identify  the  year.
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